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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this bankruptcy appeal, Debtor-Appellant Manuel 
Kaplan contests an order allowing First Options of 
Chicago's proof of claim. Kaplan argues that we should 
reverse the order allowing the claim because First Options 
materially breached the contracts under which the claim 
arose. Concluding that First Options did not breach the 
parties' contracts, the bankruptcy and district courts 





From 1981 to 1989, Manuel Kaplan was a professional 
options trader on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange. In 
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1984, Kaplan began trading through MK Investments, Inc. 
("MKI"), which was a market maker on the exchange.1 
Kaplan became MKI's sole shareholder in 1986. 
 
To facilitate its trading business, MKI entered into 
various contracts with First Options. Under these 
contracts, First Options agreed to act as MKI's clearing 
firm, providing a variety of support functions, such as 
generating account statements, keeping records, investing 
short-term funds, providing office space and margin,2 and 
guaranteeing MKI's obligations to the exchange. Since First 
Options assumed the role of MKI's guarantor, the parties' 
contracts granted First Options certain powers over MKI's 
trading account. 
 
While the business relationship between MKI and First 
Options was initially profitable, MKI's account with First 
Options suffered approximately $12 million in losses during 
the stock market crash of 1987. These losses left MKI's 
account with a deficit of approximately $2 million. As MKI's 
guarantor, First Options was liable for this deficit. First 
Options therefore attempted to minimize its exposure by 
liquidating the remaining positions in MKI's trading 
account. This liquidation created a dispute between the 
parties as Kaplan asserted that First Options' actions in 
liquidating the account needlessly compounded MKI's 
losses, rather than alleviating its deficit. 
 
After the 1987 market crash, MKI and First Options 
negotiated a Workout Agreement under which the parties 
settled their dispute and arranged for MKI to resume its 
trading activities. This Workout Agreement consisted of four 
documents: (1) a Letter Agreement executed by Kaplan, his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. A market maker is "a dealer who holds himself out . . . as being 
willing to buy or sell securities for his own account on a continuous 
basis." Philadelphia Stock Exch. By-Laws S 23-2. See also Philadelphia 
Stock Exch. Guide (CCH) P 1552. 
 
2. Under this margin arrangement, First Options extended credit to MKI 
for trading purposes. By virtue of this leverage, MKI was able to carry 
significantly larger positions than would have been available if it had 
been limited to its own capital. As a result of this lender-borrower 
relationship, a clearing firm ordinarily has a security interest in the 
positions in its customers' trading accounts. 
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wife (Carol Kaplan), First Options, and MKI; (2) a Guaranty 
executed only by MKI; (3) a Subordinated Loan Agreement 
executed by First Options and MKI; and (4) a Subordinated 
Promissory Note executed by MKI.3 Under the terms of 
these documents, MKI agreed to repay more than $5 million 
to cover its trading deficits and various other amounts that 
First Options had advanced. MKI also agreed to deposit 
$900,000 in new capital into its trading account, to turn 
over various other assets to First Options, and to clear its 
future trading activity exclusively through First Options. 
The Letter Agreement also provided that the Kaplans would 
file income tax returns to obtain any individual tax refunds 
due from 1987 and remit those refunds to First Options.4 In 
turn, First Options allowed MKI to roll over its debt and 
agreed once again to provide the clearing services and 
leverage necessary for MKI's trading business. 
 
In April 1988, MKI resumed trading pursuant to the 
terms of the Workout Agreement. Through successful 
trading, MKI increased the value of its account to 
approximately $2 million. However, before the market 
opened on January 16, 1989, Coastal Corporation 
unexpectedly announced a takeover bid for Texas Eastern 
Corporation ("TET"), a stock in which MKI had a significant 
short position.5 This position exposed MKI to potential 
losses if the price of TET stock increased.6 Unfortunately for 
MKI, this potential was realized as Coastal's bid caused 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Several of these documents involved other parties not relevant to this 
appeal. 
 
4. As this court has previously determined in a related appeal, Mr. and 
Mrs. Kaplan executed this Letter Agreement in their individual 
capacities, but executed the remaining documents only on behalf of MKI. 
See Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1513-14 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
 
5. A trader assumes a short position when he agrees to sell at a future 
date assets that he does not yet own. See Richard W. Jennings, et al., 
Securities Regulation 8 (7th ed. 1992); Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. 
Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 636 (4th ed. 1991). 
 
6. The parties agree that MKI's position was short approximately 150,000 
to 170,000 shares of TET stock. Consequently, each dollar increase in 
the price of TET stock would have increased MKI's loss by $150,000 to 
$170,000. 
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TET's price to jump from $30 to $45 before the opening of 
trading on January 16. At the $45 price, MKI would have 
lost more than $1.5 million if it had purchased enough TET 
shares to cover its short position. However, because MKI 
was not required to cover its short position immediately, it 
had an opportunity to evaluate the risk of further market 
fluctuations. Any reduction in the price of TET in the days 
following Coastal's bid would have allowed MKI to regain its 
lost value, while any further increase would have inflicted 
additional losses. 
 
The parties disagree over whether Kaplan took 
appropriate steps to analyze and alleviate the risk that the 
TET position posed to MKI's account. However, the parties 
agree that MKI was unable to reduce its short position 
significantly on January 16 despite actively trading in TET 
options and stock. First Options contends that the parties 
agreed to meet on the morning of January 17 to reassess 
MKI's position. Kaplan does not recall such an agreement 
and did not attend the meeting. When Kaplan failed to 
arrive at the meeting, First Options instructed one of MKI's 
traders to purchase the 150-170,000 shares of TET stock 
or stock options necessary to cover MKI's short position. 
While this action eliminated any further risk from the TET 
position, it also locked in MKI's existing losses and deprived 
MKI of the benefit of any future decline in TET's price. 
 
First Options personnel confronted Kaplan when he 
arrived at the exchange later on the morning of January 17. 
The bankruptcy court noted that this exchange "went 
badly." Following this conversation, First Options ordered 
Kaplan to leave the premises and took control of MKI's 
trading account. First Options disconnected MKI's phone 
lines, removed MKI's traders from the floor of the exchange, 
canceled MKI's outstanding orders and instructed brokers 
not to take orders placed by MKI. 
 
MKI's account still had a net value of approximately 
$500,000 when First Options assumed control on January 
17. However, the account's value declined as First Options 
liquidated the remaining assets over the following months. 
By the time First Options finished liquidating the account, 
it had a final deficit of approximately $65,000. 
 
                                5 
  
Kaplan filed a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11 in 
February 1993. He subsequently converted his petition to 
Chapter 7. First Options asserted a proof of claim to obtain 
the income tax refunds mentioned in the parties' Letter 
Agreement. In response, Kaplan asserted several 
counterclaims and defenses against First Options. Kaplan 
argued that First Options' actions in seizing and liquidating 
MKI's accounts breached the Workout Agreement and the 
implied obligations of good faith and fair dealing. To remedy 
these breaches, Kaplan sought damages and a ruling 
excusing his obligation to surrender his tax refund to First 
Options. The bankruptcy court rejected Kaplan's claims 
and defenses, holding that the parties' agreements explicitly 
authorized First Options' actions in seizing and liquidating 




As an initial matter, First Options asserts that we must 
consider whether Kaplan has standing to assert his 
counterclaims. First Options argues that Kaplan's 
counterclaims are improper because he seeks to recover 
personally for damages suffered by MKI. Kaplan responds 
that First Options owed direct contractual duties to him 
individually and that his claims are thus for personal 
rather than derivative injuries. The bankruptcy court did 
not address the standing issue, and the district court 
declined to address it because the court concluded that 
Kaplan's counterclaims failed on the merits. See In re 
Kaplan, Civ. Action No. 95-95-6040 at 9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 
1997). 
 
The derivative injury rule holds that a shareholder (even 
a shareholder in a closely-held corporation) may not sue for 
personal injuries that result directly from injuries to the 
corporation. See Singletary v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & 
Trust Co., 9 F.3d 1236, 1240 (7th Cir. 1993); 7 Mid-State 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Since the contract between Kaplan and First Options contains an 
Illinois choice-of-law provision, the district and bankruptcy courts 
correctly applied Illinois law to the contract claims at issue. See 
Admiral 
Corp v. Cerullo Elec. Supply Co., 32 F.R.D. 379, 381 (M.D. Pa. 1961) 
(stating that when a contract directs the usage of Illinois law, "the 
conflict of laws rules of Pennsylvania . . . [require a court] to look to 
the 
law of Illinois to determine the rights and obligations of the parties in 
interpreting the contract."). 
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Fertilizer v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 877 F.2d 1333, 1335 (7th 
Cir. 1989); Pitchford v. Pepi, Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 97 (3d Cir. 
1975). In holding that Kaplan is not personally liable for 
MKI's obligations to First Options, this court has previously 
recognized the separate corporate existence of MKI. See 
Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 
1513-14 (3d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, since Kaplan chose to 
structure his business in the corporate form and received 
the benefits of that form by avoiding liability for MKI's 
debts, the derivative injury rule prevents him from piercing 
the corporate veil in reverse in order to recover individually 
for MKI's losses. See Kagan v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 907 
F.2d 690 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that plaintiffs could not 
obtain both "limited liability for debts incurred in the 
corporate name, and direct compensation for its losses."). 
 
The derivative injury rule, however, will not bar Kaplan's 
claims if he seeks to recover for injuries that were inflicted 
on him individually rather than on the corporation. See 
Kroblin Refrigerated XPress, Inc. v. Pitterich, 805 F.2d 96, 
104 (3d Cir. 1986). Since Kaplan signed the Workout 
Agreement in his individual capacity and thereby promised 
to give First Options his income tax refund, the central 
question with respect to the standing issue concerns the 
nature of the consideration, if any, that Kaplan himself 
received in exchange for this personal commitment. If he 
received promises in his individual capacity, he may sue for 
the breach of those promises. Id. Likewise, if First Options 
materially breached its promises to Kaplan, he may assert 
that breach as a defense to First Options' proof of claim. 
See generally Regan v. Garfield Ridge Trust & Savings 
Bank, 581 N.E.2d 759, 765 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts SS 237, 241 (1979). 
 
A review of the parties' contracts and their positions in 
this litigation makes it clear that First Options gave Kaplan 
some commitment as consideration for his promise to remit 
his tax refund.8 But, while it is clear that Kaplan received 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. If Kaplan had not received some consideration, his promise to pay 
would be an unenforceable gratuitous gift. See Serpe v. Williams, 776 F. 
Supp. 1285, 1288 (N.D. Ill. 1991) ("Mutuality of obligation means either 
both parties are bound to the agreement or neither party is bound. . . . 
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some consideration for his promise to give up his tax 
refund, the parties disagree about exactly what 
commitment Kaplan received. An argument could be made 
that Kaplan received only a release from personal liability 
for MKI's pre-workout debts. Two provisions of the Workout 
Agreement specifically mention Kaplan in his individual 
capacity. In one of these provisions, Kaplan promises to 
give First Options his tax refund. In the other, First Options 
releases Kaplan from any personal liability for MKI's pre- 
workout deficits.9 Since these are the only provisions in the 
agreements that mention Kaplan in his individual capacity, 
First Options apparently concludes that Kaplan received 
only the release as consideration for his commitment to 
surrender his tax refund. If we were to accept this 
argument, we would hold that Kaplan has standing to 
enforce the release, but does not have standing to assert 
claims for a breach of First Options' promise to provide 
services to MKI or to assert the breach of those promises as 
a defense to First Options' proof of claim.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Both parties must be liable to the other for failure to perform his or her 
obligation."); Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 71 ("To constitute 
consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained 
for."). However, neither party asserts that Kaplan's promise is anything 
but an enforceable commitment. 
 
9. Kaplan has consistently asserted that he is not personally liable for 
MKI's debts, but this provision released him from any challenge to that 
position. 
 
10. Kaplan argues that, even if he lacks standing to seek recovery from 
First Options in his personal capacity, he has standing to assert the 
material breach of the parties' agreements as a defense to First Options' 
proof of claim. However, we believe that the considerations that govern 
Kaplan's standing to bring his counterclaims also determine his standing 
to assert the defense of a material breach of the parties' contract. If a 
release from liability was the only consideration that Kaplan received for 
his tax refund and if First Options honored that release, Kaplan cannot 
assert the breach of other promises to other entities as a defense to his 
obligation to surrender his refund. However, if the parties intended for 
Kaplan to give up his refund to benefit MKI, Kaplan is a direct party to 
the contract and may assert a material breach of the promise to benefit 
MKI as a defense to First Options' efforts to enforce the contract. See 
generally Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 305(1) (noting that a 
promisor in a third-party contract has a duty to the promisee to perform, 
even though he also has a similar duty to the intended beneficiary). 
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We conclude, however, that the plain text of the parties' 
agreements refutes this interpretation. The parties concur 
that they executed the Workout Agreement for two 
purposes: to resolve their dispute over MKI's pre-workout 
debts and to enable MKI to get back into business. The 
bankruptcy court noted that the parties intended for the 
Workout Agreement to enable MKI to resume trading, see In 
re Kaplan, Bankr. No. 93-10625DAS at 4 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
March 7, 1995), and that interpretation is clearly supported 
by the text of the Letter Agreement. The Agreement 
acknowledges MKI's debt to First Options and provides a 
detailed scheme under which MKI agreed immediately to 
pay down the debt by surrendering a list of assets to First 
Options. See Joint App. at 75a-90a. Kaplan's promise to 
surrender his tax refund is placed in the midst of this list 
of assets to be surrendered, and Kaplan's refund is also 
specifically earmarked to pay down MKI's debt. See id. at 
77a. MKI further promised to infuse new capital into its 
trading account and agreed to pay the remainder of its debt 
from future trading profits. See id. at 76a-83a, 85a. In 
exchange for these assets and promises, First Options 
agreed once again to provide the clearing services necessary 
to enable MKI to resume trading. See id. at 84a-85a. Based 
on these provisions, it is clear to us that the parties 
intended for Kaplan to surrender his refund in order to get 
MKI back on its feet. In other words, the Agreement 
demonstrates that Kaplan exchanged his refund in part for 
First Options' promise to provide clearing services and 
leverage to assist MKI in its effort to resume trading. 
 
Under this interpretation, MKI is an intended third-party 
beneficiary to Kaplan's commitment, and First Options' 
corresponding promises to provide services to MKIflow 
both to MKI and to Kaplan individually. See generally Olson 
v. Etheridge, 686 N.E.2d 563, 566 (Ill. 1997) (noting that a 
contract entered into for the direct benefit of a third person 
is enforceable in Illinois); Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
S 302(1)(b); 17A Am. Jur. 2d ContractsS 440 (1991). 
Accordingly, since Kaplan is a direct party to the 
Agreement, he has standing to sue for the breach of First 
Options' commitment to provide services to MKI. See Olson, 
686 N.E.2d at 566 (recognizing that both a promisee and an 
intended third party beneficiary may sue to enforce a 
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contract); Buschmann v. Professional Men's Ass'n, 405 F.2d 
659, 662 (7th Cir. 1969) ("It is well settled that an 
individual cause of action can be asserted when the wrong 
is both to the stockholder as an individual and to the 
corporation."); Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 305 
comment a (noting that a promisee may recover damages 
that flow from a promisor's failure to perform to the 
intended beneficiary); 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts S 436 
(recognizing that a promisor owes overlapping duties to a 




First Options raises another bar to our consideration of 
the merits of Kaplan's claims. First Options asserts that 
Kaplan's claims are barred by res judicata and collateral 
estoppel because he controlled MKI when First Options and 
MKI arbitrated similar claims before the Philadelphia 
Exchange. First Options raised this argument before the 
bankruptcy court in a motion to dismiss. The bankruptcy 
court12 noted that under Pennsylvania's control-of-litigation 
rule, a party may be bound by the results of litigation even 
if that party, although not a litigant or in privity with a 
litigant, was "virtually substituted for the actual party in 
the management and control of the litigation." In re Kaplan, 
Bankr. No. 93-10625DAS at 18-20 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 
1995) (quoting Williams v. Lumberman's Ins. Co. of 
Philadelphia, 1 A.2d 658, 660-61 (Pa. 1938)). However, the 
bankruptcy court denied First Options' motion to dismiss 
because it concluded that applying the control-of-litigation 
rule to this case would eviscerate the rule that a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Our conclusion that MKI is an intended third-party beneficiary to 
Kaplan's promise is sufficient to resolve First Options' assertion that 
Kaplan lacks standing. Accordingly, we need not determine what 
damages Kaplan may recover if it proves that First Options breached its 
promises. See generally Banker's Trust Co. v. Steenburn, 409 N.Y.S.2d 
51, 65-69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (discussing one of several measures of a 
third party promisee's damages); Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
SS 305, 307, 310 (same). 
 
12. Because the district court concluded that Kaplan's counterclaims 
lacked substantive merit, it did not address this issue. See Kaplan, Civ. 
Action No. 95-6040 at 9. 
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shareholder is generally not precluded by a corporation's 
prior litigation.13 See id. 
 
We need not decide whether the bankruptcy court 
correctly interpreted Pennsylvania law14  because we hold 
that the preclusive effect of MKI's prior litigation is 
governed by federal, not Pennsylvania, law. 
 
To understand the choice-of-law issue that this case 
presents, we must examine how the parties came to this 
stage of their litigation. In their previous appeal, the parties 
petitioned the federal district court to confirm or vacate the 
Philadelphia Exchange's arbitration award. Since the 
Federal Arbitration Act does not independently confer 
subject matter jurisdiction on the federal courts, see, e.g., 
General Atomic Co. v. United Nuclear Corp., 655 F.2d 968, 
970-71 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing cases that stand for this 
proposition); TM Marketing, Inc. v. Art & Antiques Assocs., 
L.P., 803 F. Supp. 994, 997-98 (D. N.J. 1992) (same), the 
parties invoked the district court's diversity jurisdiction. 
See Kaplan, 19 F.3d at 1509. The district court confirmed 
the arbitration award against MKI, and it is that judgment 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The bankruptcy court also concluded that, for purposes of the 
motion to dismiss, First Options failed to show that Kaplan controlled 
MKI's prior arbitration. 
 
14. Pennsylvania's appellate courts have repeatedly held that a judgment 
against a corporation is not binding on a shareholder or officer of the 
corporation in subsequent litigation. See, e.g., Hornstein v. Kramer Bros. 
Freight Lines, Inc., 133 F.2d 143, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1943); Amalgamated 
Cotton Garment and Allied Indus. Fund v. Campolong, 463 A.2d 1129, 
1130-31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); Philadelphia Auburn-Cord Co. v. Shockcor, 
2 A.2d 501, 501 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1938); Macan v. Scandinavia Belting Co., 
107 A. 750, 752-53 (Pa. 1919). While Pennsylvania's courts have also 
adopted the control of litigation rule, First Options cites no 
Pennsylvania 
authority that has applied the rule to a closely held corporation. Rather, 
Pennsylvania seems to have rejected the position taken in the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments that a judgment against a closely 
held corporation is conclusive against the corporation's stockholders. See 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 59(3) (1982); Macan, 107 A. at 752- 
53 (refusing to hold that a corporation's prior litigation was res 
judicata 
against the corporation's largest shareholder because "[a] corporation 
has a separate entity or existence, irrespective of the persons who own 
its stock, and this rule is not altered by the fact that the greater 
portion 
or even the entire issue of stock happens to be held by one person."). 
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that First Options claims has a preclusive effect on 
Kaplan's instant litigation. 
 
In contrast to the parties' first case, this litigation was 
brought under the federal bankruptcy laws, and therefore 
the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 158(a). 
Accordingly, this case presents the question of which law 
governs the preclusive effect of a prior federal court 
judgment rendered under diversity jurisdiction on a 
subsequent case arising under the bankruptcy laws. The 
Supreme Court addressed that question in Heiser v. 
Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 66 S.Ct. 853 (1946). The Court 
applied the federal law of res judicata to determine the 
preclusive effect of a prior diversity judgment, stating that 
"[i]t has been held in non-diversity cases since Erie v. 
Tomkins, that the federal courts will apply their own rule of 
res judicata." Id. at 733. Accordingly, we will apply federal 
preclusion principles to this case.15 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. This conclusion is supported by the rationale advanced by the 
majority of circuits in holding that federal law governs the preclusive 
effect of a diversity judgment in a subsequent diversity suit. These 
courts 
have reasoned that preclusion rules are procedural rather than 
substantive, and therefore the Erie doctrine does not require federal 
courts to apply state law. See, e.g., Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 707 
F.2d 
1493, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Moreover, these courts have noted that the 
federal courts have a significant interest in determining the preclusive 
effect of federal judgments. See, e.g., Johnson v. SCA Disposal Services 
of New England, Inc., 931 F.2d 970, 974 n.11 (1st Cir. 1991). As the 
Second Circuit stated in Kern v. Hettinger, 303 F.2d 333, 340 (2d Cir. 
1962): 
 
       One of the strongest policies a court can have is that of 
determining 
       the scope of its own judgments. . . . It would be destructive of 
the 
       basic principles of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to say 
that 
       the effect of a judgment of a federal court was governed by the law 
       of the state where the court sits simply because the source of 
federal 
       jurisdiction is diversity. . . . [I]t would be a strange doctrine 
to allow 
       a state to nullify the judgments of federal courts constitutionally 
       established and given power also to enforce state created rights. 
 
See also, RecoverEdge L.P. v. Pentecost, 44 F.3d 1284, 1290 n.11 (5th 
Cir.1995); Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Freeman, Atkins & Coleman, Ltd., 
58 F.3d 303, 307 (7th Cir. 1995); Shoup v. Bell and Howell, Co., 872 
F.2d 1178, 1179 (4th Cir. 1989); Petromanagement Corp. v. Acme-Thomas 
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Although several federal courts have held that a 
shareholder is bound by his corporation's prior litigation if 
he participated substantially in the suit, see , e.g., In re 
Teltronics Servs., Inc., 762 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1985) ("A 
judgment against a corporation bars later litigation on the 
same cause of action by an officer, director, or shareholder 
of the corporation if the individual participated in and 
effectively controlled the earlier case."), we decline to apply 
this rule in the context of this case. 
 
It is cardinal rule that "[a]rbitration is a matter of 
contract, and parties are bound by arbitration awards only 
if they agreed to arbitrate a matter." E.g., Teamsters Local 
Union No. 764 v. J.H. Merritt and Co., 770 F.2d 40, 42 (3d 
Cir. 1985). Applying this rule, we concluded in a previous 
appeal that Kaplan did not consent to the jurisdiction of the 
Exchange's arbitration panel, and we therefore rejected 
First Options' attempt to confirm the panel's decision 
against Kaplan in his individual capacity. See Kaplan, 19 
F.3d at 1510-23. This conclusion was affirmed by the 
Supreme Court. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 
514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995). See also id. at 942 ("a party who 
has not agreed to arbitrate will normally have a right to a 
court's decision about the merits of its dispute."). 
 
First Options, however, now asks us to hold that, 
although it has already been conclusively adjudicated that 
Kaplan withheld consent to be bound personally by the 
arbitration award or the prior judgment confirming the 
arbitration award against MKI, he is nevertheless bound 
because he controlled the prior litigation on MKI's behalf. 
We reject First Options' argument. Generally applicable res 
judicata rules must sometimes be adapted to fit the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Joint Venture, 835 F.2d 1329. 1333 (10th Cir. 1988); Precision Air Parts, 
Inc. v. Avco Corp., 736 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. 1984); Silcox v. United 
Trucking Serv., Inc., 687 F.2d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 1982); Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments S 87 comment b, at 317-18 (1982); Ronan E. 
Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 Yale L.J. 741, 769-70 (1976). 
However, while these authorities persuasively support our conclusion in 
this case, we note that this circuit has not yet decided which preclusion 
law it will apply in the successive-diversity context. See Venuto v. Witco 
Corp., 117 F.3d 754, 758 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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arbitration context. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 
470 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1985); NLRB v. Yellow Freight 
Systems, Inc., 930 F.2d 316, 319-21 (3d Cir. 1991); General 
Comm. of Adjustment v. CSX Corp., 893 F.2d 584, 593 n.10 
(3d Cir. 1990) ("traditional principles of stare decisis and 
res judicata are given significantly less weight in arbitration 
proceedings"); Leddy v. Standard Drywall, Inc., 875 F.2d 
383, 385 (2d Cir. 1989); Kovats v. Rutgers, 749 F.2d 1041, 
1048 (3d Cir. 1984).16 Moreover, we believe that First 
Options' argument is inconsistent with the rule that the 
scope of the obligation to arbitrate -- and to accept arbitral 
decisions -- is defined by contract. An arbitration 
agreement may limit its preclusive effects. See Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments S 84(4). Where, as in this case, a 
corporation agrees to arbitration but the corporation's 
principal and sole shareholder withholds such consent, we 
presume, in the absence of any contractual provision 
addressing the issue of res judicata in so many words, that 
the parties agreed that the principal and sole shareholder, 
who would necessarily control the corporation's 
participation in any arbitration proceeding or litigation, 
would not be bound by any arbitral award or judgment 
based on the theory that he or she controlled the relevant 
proceeding. Any other rule would render essentially 
meaningless the principal and sole shareholder's 
withholding of consent to be bound personally by the 
arbitral award or judgment. For these reasons, we hold that 




We turn now to the merits of Kaplan's counterclaims. 
Kaplan asserts that First Options had no contractual right 
to assume control of MKI's account, evict MKI from its 
offices, or prevent him from running MKI's affairs. Kaplan 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Cf. McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 287 (1984) 
(holding that federal courts may not apply res judicata or collateral 
estoppel to an unreviewed arbitration award in a case brought under 42 
U.S.C. S 1983); Kremer v. Chemical Contstr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 477 
(1982) ("Arbitration decisions . . . are not subject to the mandate of 
[the 
Full Faith and Credit Statute]."). 
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also asserts that First Options improperly dissipated MKI's 
assets in the process of liquidating its account. He argues 
that these actions breached both the express provisions of 
the parties' agreements and First Options' implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. Kaplan argues that these 
breaches entitle him to damages and also discharge his 
obligation to surrender his income tax return. 
 
We begin by considering Kaplan's breach of contract 
claim. We analyze a claim for breach of contract byfirst 
examining the plain language of the parties' agreements. 
See American Flint Glass Workers Union v. Beaumont Glass 
Co., 62 F.3d 574, 581 (3d Cir. 1995). Accordingly, we must 
look to the language of the parties' contracts to discover the 
extent of First Options' rights. 
 
First Options argues that several provisions in the 
parties' agreements grant it unfettered discretion to 
liquidate MKI's account.17 Thefirst of these provisions 
states: 
 
       The undersigned [MKI] agrees to keep good, in every 
       account in which the undersigned has an interest, a 
       margin satisfactory to you [First Options] from time to 
       time, and in the event that any such margin shall in 
       your discretion be deemed insufficient, you shall have 
       the right, whenever in your discretion you deem it 
       necessary, to sell any or all of the undersigned's 
       securities and other property, to buy any or all 
       securities and other property of which the undersigned 
       may be short, and to close out any or all outstanding 
       contracts, all without demand for margin or additional 
       margin. 
 
The remaining provisions are similar: 
 
       4. Clearing Member [First Options] and Clearing 
       Corporation are each hereby severally authorized 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. These provisions are embodied in several contracts executed before 
and after the 1987 workout: (a) the Combined Market Makers', 
Specialists' or Registered Traders' Account Agreement dated June 1, 
1987 and (b) the Market Maker's Agreements dated November 15, 1984 
and June 1, 1987. As the bankruptcy court found, the two Market 
Maker's Agreements are identical. 
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       by Member [MKI], whenever it considers it 
       necessary for its protection, . . . to sell out or buy 
       in any position or other asset in the Account, to 
       cancel any open uncleared transaction, to exercise 
       any option, and to close out the Account in whole 
       or in part. 
 
       5. Any exercise, purchase, sale, buy in, sell out, 
       netting, liquidation or cancellation made under this 
       agreement, of the Account or any position or other 
       assert therein may be made by . . . Clearing 
       Member, . . .; according to its judgment and 
       discretion, at public or private sale and without 
       notice to Member. 
 
As the bankruptcy court concluded, these provisions grant 
broad powers to First Options. Specifically, the provisions 
authorize First Options to buy assets in which the account 
has a short position, sell assets in the account, and close 
out the account entirely. Any of these actions may be taken 
whenever First Options deems it necessary for its 
protection. Accordingly, Kaplan's argument that First 
Options was not authorized to liquidate the account once 
the TET risk was eliminated is incorrect. 
 
However, the parties' agreements do not grant First 
Options unlimited authority. As Kaplan asserts, the 
foregoing provisions do not authorize First Options to 
purchase new securities unless those securities are 
purchased to cover a short position. While the agreement 
states that First Options may "sell out or buy in any 
position or other asset in the Account," that phrase must 
be read in light of the parties' use of language in the 
agreement. The parties apparently use the phrases"sell 
out" and "buy in" to mean the acts of selling assets in the 
account and purchasing assets to cover the account's short 
positions. Thus, a "buy in" refers to the power to "buy any 
or all securities and other property of which the 
undersigned may be short." 
 
Kaplan asserts that First Options "churned" the MKI 
account by opening new positions--i.e., purchasing new 
securities for which MKI did not have a short position at 
the time First Options assumed control. To the extent that 
First Options did this, it exceeded its contractual authority. 
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As discussed above, First Options did have the right to 
take control of and liquidate the MKI account. However, 
First Options' rights did not amount to the unfettered 
discretion of absolute ownership. Rather, the agreements 
state specifically what actions First Options could take to 
liquidate the account. The agreement's language is simply 
not broad enough to permit First Options to manage the 
account without limitation--buying and selling securities 
unrelated to positions in the account until the account's 
equity was dissipated. Kaplan offered evidence that First 
Options opened new positions that were unrelated to any 
preexisting short position.18 Accordingly, we will remand the 
case to allow the bankruptcy court to compare the evidence 
of First Options' actions to the actions specifically 




Kaplan asserts that First Options' conduct not only 
violated the express provisions of the parties' agreements, 
but also breached the covenant of good faith and fair 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. The bankruptcy court stated that Kaplan failed to present sufficient 
evidence of such "opening trades" and failed to allege that these trades 
decreased the value of MKI's account. See In re Kaplan, Bankr. No. 93- 
10625DAS at 18. This conclusion may well be true. We express no 
opinion as to the sufficiency of Kaplan's evidence because the parties 
have not addressed the issue, First Options has not asserted it as an 
alternative basis for affirmance, and we believe that the bankruptcy 
court is better suited to compare the evidence with the parties' contracts 
since it presided over the trial and is familiar with the complex stock- 
trading documentation at issue. Given our conclusion that First Options 
did not enjoy unlimited discretion under the parties' contracts, we 
remand to allow the bankruptcy court to compare the evidence 
supporting Kaplan's various allegations to the specific actions permitted 
by the parties' contracts. This comparison need not be limited to opening 
trades but could involve any unauthorized activities. 
 
Lastly, we note that the bankruptcy court's statement regarding 
Kaplan's evidence assumes that, once Kaplan proves a breach of the 
parties' promises, his damages are to be measured by the value of MKI's 
account. As previously noted, we do not decide the proper measure of 
Kaplan's damages, and we therefore express no opinion on the validity 
of this assumption. See supra n.10. 
 
                                17 
  
dealing implied in every contract. The district court 
correctly stated the law on the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing: 
 
       [U]nder Illinois law, a covenant to deal fairly and in 
       good faith is implied in every contract. Saunders v. 
       Michigan Ave. Nat'l Bank, 278 Ill. App. 3d 307, 622 
       N.E.2d 602, appeal denied, 167 Ill.2d 569, 667 N.E. 2d 
       1063 (1996); Northern Trust Co. v. VII Michigan Assoc., 
       276 Ill. App. 3d 355, 657 N.E.2d 1095 (1995); Abbott v. 
       Amoco Oil Co., 249 Ill.App.3d 774, 619 N.E.2d 789 
       (1993), appeal denied, 153 Ill.2d 968 (1985). Moreover, 
       this duty requires the party vested with discretion 
       under the contract `to exercise that discretion 
       reasonably and with proper motive, . . . not . . . 
       arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a manner inconsistent 
       with the reasonable expectations of the parties.' 
       Saunders, 662 N.E.2d 602 (quoting Dayan v. 
       McDonald's Corp., 125 Ill.App.3d 972, 991, 466 N.E.2d 
       958, 972 (1984)). 
 
In re Kaplan, Civ. Action No. 95-95-6040 at 20. 
 
The bankruptcy and district courts rejected Kaplan's bad 
faith claim because they concluded that First Options' 
actions in closing the account were specifically authorized 
by the parties' agreements. The bankruptcy court stated 
that First Options' "right to take control of the Account was 
practically unfettered and in its sole discretion" and that 
"[n]othing in the Workout Agreement purported to limit or 
qualify in any way [First Options'] rights under the Account 
Agreements." In re Kaplan, Bankr. No. 93-10625DAS at 14- 
15, 24. Accordingly, although the bankruptcy court stated 
that First Options' actions were "unorthodox and not 
consistent with industry practice" and "were possibly 
tainted by personal animus," it concluded that Kaplan's 
claim lacked merit. Id., at 24-25. 
 
We agree with the lower courts' conclusion that the 
language of the parties' agreements protects First Options' 
interest in the account by granting it extraordinarily broad 
discretion to eliminate risk and close the account. However, 
the agreements do not give First Options the right to act in 
bad faith or in a commercially unreasonable manner. The 
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relationship between a margin account customer and 
broker is generally that of a pledgor and pledgee. See In re 
Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 103 F.2d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 1939); 
Restatement of Security S 12 (1941). Accordingly, while the 
pledgee may have a discretionary right to liquidate the 
margined securities, it must do so in good faith and in a 
commercially reasonable manner. See Modern Settings, Inc. 
v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 936 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir. 
1991) (holding that the discretionary right to liquidate a 
securities account must be exercised in good faith); (citing 
Cauble v. Mabon Nugent & Co., 594 F. Supp. 985, 992 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984)). Accordingly, First Options' argument that 
it has "absolute discretion to control risk stemming from 
the accounts of its customers, including MKI" is incorrect 
insofar as it claims a right to liquidate MKI's account in 
bad faith or in a commercially unreasonable manner.19 
 
It is true that the obligation of good faith and fair dealing 
cannot be used to negate specific contractual powers, even 
if the exercise of those powers causes harsh results. See 
Olmos v. Golding, 736 F. Supp. 1472, 1479 n.5 (N.D. Ill 
1989); Continental Bank, N.A. v. Everett, 964 F.2d 701, 705 
(7th Cir. 1992). "Parties are entitled to enforce the terms of 
negotiated contracts to the letter without being mulcted for 
lack of good faith: express covenants abrogate the operation 
of implied so courts will not permit implied agreements to 
overrule or modify the express contract of the parties." RTC 
v. Holtzman, 618 N.E.2d 418, 424 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
"When a contract is silent, principles of good faith . . . fill 
the gap. They do not block the use of terms that actually 
appear in the contract." Kham & Nates Shoes No.2, Inc. v. 
First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990). However, 
in this case the language of the parties agreements provides 
that First Options may, in its discretion, buy in, sell out, or 
close out the account. Since one purpose of the implied 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. The Seventh Circuit has stated that Illinois does not recognize an 
action for breach of the implied covenant independent of a breach of 
contract claim. Continental Bank, 964 F.2d at 705. However, as 
discussed above, Kaplan has brought a viable breach of contract claim 
alleging that First Options churned the account by opening and closing 
new positions not represented in the account at the time First Options 
assumed its management. 
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covenant of good faith is to "check the exercise of a party's 
discretion under a contract," Bane v. Ferguson, 707 F. 
Supp. 988, 994 (N.D. Ill 1989), aff'd, 890 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 
1989); see also Dayan, 466 N.E.2d at 972, First Options' 
discretion to take these actions is subject to the 
requirement that it exercise that discretion in good faith. 
Moreover, while it is true that the implied covenant will not 
negate or modify express terms, the terms in the parties' 
contracts leave great room for discretion and thus for the 
application of the implied covenant. 
 
First Options points out that the bankruptcy court's 
opinion contains some language indicating that it did not 
act in bad faith. However, those statements are in tension 
with the court's statements that First Options' actions were 
unorthodox and possibly tainted by personal animus and 
with the statement that Kaplan's expectations were"not 
necessarily unreasonable." As noted above, the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing requires that a party exercise its 
discretion "reasonably and with proper motive, . . . not . . . 
arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a manner inconsistent with 
the reasonable expectations of the parties." In re Kaplan, 
Civ. Action No. 95-95-6040 at 20. Accordingly, since First 
Options enjoyed a qualified discretion to take control of and 
liquidate MKI's account, we will remand to allow the lower 
courts to consider whether First Options exercised its 




For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the 
district court and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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